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Abstract: This article re-examines recent studies that link different forms of social 
diversity—ethnic polarization and fractionalization—to underdevelopment and an increased 
risk of civil war. We review theoretical arguments in favor of a connection between 
diversity and these social outcomes and discuss the inter-linkage between economic growth 
and internal conflict in situations of extreme diversity. Our analysis confirms that the 
relationship between ethnic polarization and civil war is ambiguous and depends on the use 
of civil war incidence or civil war onset as an outcome variable. Furthermore, 
fractionalization rather than polarization seems to be negatively related to economic growth.  
Keywords: civil war; development; polarization; fractionalization 
 
1. Introduction  
Throughout the past decade, the social and political implications of social diversity have received 
widespread attention in economics and the social sciences. While management theorists and 
sociologists often see diversity as an asset to a firm or a society (e.g., [1]), political scientists and 
economists, conversely, often warn about the dangers of an increasing fragmentation or polarization of 
a country. The best known caveat against the alleged perils of diversity is Huntington‘s [2] essay The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which the late Harvard academic painted 
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the picture of an increasing risk of conflict between incompatible ―civilizations‖ such as the West and 
the Islamic world. Although careful analyses of the historical and statistical evidence have contradicted 
this thesis (e.g., [3,4]), it has considerably shaped the popular and, to some extent, also the academic 
discussion, on the political and economic effects that relevant social, economic or religious cleavages 
may have.  
Social scientists have, however, moved beyond this pessimistic backdrop through the development 
of sophisticated arguments that link different facets of social heterogeneity to various social outcomes. 
This article evaluates recent conceptual innovations and empirical findings on the effects of diversity 
on the risk of internal war and on economic growth. In this article we contrast the two most frequently 
used diversity indicators, ―fractionalization‖ and ―polarization‖, which according to recent studies can 
be seen as explanations of both violent internal conflict and economic stagnation. To make this 
discussion more specific, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these competing concepts 
through an evaluation of two frequently cited studies by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (henceforth 
MRQ) [5,6]. These authors have broken new ground in the literature by arguing, and demonstrating 
empirically, that especially one form of diversity, polarization, increases the risk of civil war and also 
has a negative impact on the provision of public goods and the growth prospects of a country. Thus, 
we believe that this pioneering work provides an excellent point of departure to re-examine these 
findings and highlight problems in the study of diversity. To this end, we first identify theoretical 
problems that emerge when we try to link the different facets of diversity to a wide range of social ills. 
Empirically, we develop a research design that follows as closely as possible the two exemplary 
articles that guide our study. The re-examination shows that well-founded alterations of the research 
design lead to different results. We particularly use ―onset‖ rather than ―incidence‖ as a measure of the 
outcome variable ―civil war‖; classify groups differently; and assess the influence of polarization on 
economic growth drawing on a prominent model developed by Easterly and Levine [7]. The results 
suggest that the relationship between polarization and conflict is ambiguous and that it might also be 
rather fractionalization and thus fragmentation that hinders economic growth. The article concludes 
with the recommendation that the study of diversity in the social sciences should rely on empirical 
indicators that are more closely linked to rigorous theoretical reasoning and that move away from the 
conviction that one particular measure of diversity can be successfully applicable to all contexts.  
2. Theory and Measurement of Diversity in the Social Sciences 
Diversity is a vague enough term to invite all sorts of expectations about the possible benefits and 
ills it may bring about. In our view, such general discussions about the pros and cons of social 
heterogeneity are misleading, as we need to be specific about which form of diversity we try to link to 
a particular social outcome. The most frequently used diversity indicator is the fractionalization index 
which stems from the Hirschman-Herfindahl measure of concentration (compare with [8]). Formally, 
fractionalization (F) is defined as follows:  
)1(
1
i
N
i
iF  

      (1) 
where  stands for the relative size of the relevant social groups, be they ethnically, religiously or 
linguistically defined.  
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Ethnic fractionalization has played a key role in research on economic growth and in public 
economics. Easterly and Levine ([7], p. 1241) argue that a high level of ―ethnic diversity is closely 
associated with low schooling, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, 
and insufficient infrastructure‖. Collier [9] conversely maintains that a country‘s institutional setting is 
able to mediate such adverse effects of fragmentation. In his view, the negative impact of 
fractionalization on development is restricted to autocratic countries. Alesina and LaFerrara [10] 
examine this claim, yet find only weak support for it. Their empirical results show that rich countries 
are better able to manage diversity than poorer ones.  
In recent years, diversity arguments have also increasingly shaped the area of conflict research, 
which for decades has been a strong subfield of political science and to which a growing number of 
economists contribute. Ellingsen‘s [11] pioneering study regressed domestic civil unrest on various 
indicators and found that multiethnicity was a powerful determinant of domestic conflict. Furthermore, 
her article shows that the relationship between the number of groups within a society and the risk of 
civil war is of a curvilinear nature, with an increasing propensity towards war in a country with several 
compared to a few or many groups. This is similar to the argument of Collier and Hoeffler [12]. They 
demonstrate that the dominance of one strong group in heterogeneous countries is associated with a 
higher probability of war. Collier [9] qualifies societies as ―dominated‖ if the largest group contains 
between 45 and 90% of the overall population. In contrast, Hegre et al. [13] find that fractionalization 
is linked to an increased risk of civil war. The frequently cited study by Fearon and Laitin [14] does 
not lend empirical support to the thesis that fragmentation increases the risk of an internal war; the 
meta-evaluation of Hegre and Sambanis [15] supports this result.  
It can, in our view, be easily explained theoretically why the link between fractionalization and 
conflict is unclear. To start with, consider the case in which every social group i were to split into k 
equally sized subgroups, each now with size i/k. Since these smaller groups do not have the same 
resource base as the larger ones, we cannot assume that they would bother to engage in an internal war 
as they could not credibly threaten a larger group with the usage of armed force. Similarly, it is unclear 
as to why societies that are highly fractionalized should suffer from reduced economic development. 
While a growing number of groups increase the coordination costs in a society, it also fuels the 
competition between these groups and, in the absence of any institutional considerations, the efficiency 
of an economy (cf. [10]). In other words, increasing fractionalization of a country can be good and bad 
for the development of a country. As a result, the link between fragmentation and economic growth is 
theoretically as underspecified as the one with civil war.  
Given these theoretical conjectures and empirical contradictions, it is unsurprising that students of 
diversity have developed alternative indices. Particularly the concept of polarization has gained 
prominence in the field through the development of axiomatic measures by Esteban and Ray [16] that 
the authors applied to the formal analysis of social conflict in a later paper [17]. Based on four 
straightforward axioms and on Esteban and Ray [16], Duclos and colleagues [18] have developed a 
measure of polarization that depends on the separate contributions of alienation and identification and 
on their joint co-movement. This leads to a measure that is proportional to the sum of all effective 
antagonisms within a society ([16], p. 831).  
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Formally, the polarization measure developed by Duclos et al. [18] for a continuous distribution F 
can be written as 
 
 125.0,)()()( 1  dxdyyxyfxfFP    (2) 
In Equation (2), x and y are for instance individual ideological positions or income levels. The 
model presumes that alienation is monotonically growing in the distance |x − y|. Alternatively, the P(F) 
measure can also be written as the product of three components 
]1)[,()()(   FiFaFP           (3) 
where a(F) stands for average alienation, i(F,) for average identification and  for the normalized 
covariance between identification and alienation [19]. The measurement of polarization identifies 
whether the distribution of a particular societal attribute like income or ideology displays group modes. 
Typical inequality measures like the Gini-index fail to capture this feature. It should nevertheless be 
noted that polarization and inequality (Gini) coincide if  is 0. The restriction ≥ 0.25 is crucial. It is 
only with this assumption that (2) behaves differently in comparison to inequality indices [20]. 
Reynal-Querol ([23,24], see also [5]) has, based on Esteban and Ray [16], introduced a new 
measure of polarization (henceforth RQ). It can be summarized as follows: 
)1(4
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
         (4) 
Note that, similar to fractionalization, the RQ measure grows through a split of a group into smaller 
units if the original group is smaller or equal to 70% of the overall population [25]. In the absence of 
detailed individual-level information for a large number of countries, the polarization measure used by 
MRQ, and originally proposed by Reynal-Querol [23], differs from the Esteban and Ray [17] index by 
only considering binary attributes of an individual, for instance whether he or she belongs to a group or 
not. As a consequence, the animosity between groups is identical, which seems at present highly 
unlikely if we compare the typically relatively low level of hostility between Catholics and Protestants 
in the past decades with the much less harmonious relations between Muslims and Christians in many 
countries. Furthermore, the index does not take into account the possible variance of other relevant 
attributes of a person like income or ideology within a particular group or the varying attachment to a 
group among its members.  
Esteban and Ray [17] show, as indicated, in a rentseeking model that the level of conflict in a 
society should be largest when the population, which can be classified according to some interval-level 
measures, is split symmetrically into two equally powerful groups. Reynal-Querol [23] and Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol [5] demonstrate for their measures that ―a two-point symmetric distribution of 
population maximizes conflict‖ ([5], p. 798). Note, however, that the conceptualization of conflict in 
these models avoids a clear distinction between investment in conflict instruments like weapons or 
soldiers and the costs of fighting. In other words, the extant rentseeking models of conflict do not 
consider the possible deterrent effect that armament might have. Standard models in international 
relations show that an equality of resources between two contending sides might lead to a precarious 
peace as the competing poles are able to deter each other from using force (e.g., [26]). Hence, the 
conflict potential in bipolar societies might be very large, but such situations must not necessarily be 
linked to an increased number of conflict onsets. A more recent rentseeking model by Esteban and 
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Ray [25] that explores the impact of fractionalization and polarization on conflict in detail confirms 
this. They ―expect the overall degree of conflict to be maximal in societies with intermediate levels of 
polarization‖ ([25], p. 180). 
We also do not see a clear link between high degrees of polarization and economic development. 
On the contrary, bipolar societies have fewer coordination problems than highly fragmented ones. One 
way in which bi-polarization could cause underdevelopment is through the domination of one strong 
group by another powerful, but parasitic force. This is for instance often the case in countries such as 
Ruanda where the domineering group typically excludes the competing ethnicity from the government 
and tries to hold on to power in economically adverse times through repression [27]. The inclusion of 
such considerations would, however, make it necessary to study the inter-linkage between polarization 
and social outcomes through institutionalist lenses and to particularly examine how inclusive 
governments are (cf. [28]). We will come back on these possible extensions of the analysis of diversity 
in the conclusion of this article. 
3. Polarization, Fractionalization and Conflict 
The study of the social outcomes of diversity does not only need sound theoretical arguments, it 
equally has to be based on transparent operational definitions and case selection criteria. Before we 
present our results, this section discusses how key contributions to the applied study of diversity have 
dealt with these research design issues. The starting point for any empirical study in this area is the 
selection of relevant social groups. Until the 1990s, most work on country-level diversity relied on the 
Soviet Atlas Norodov [29]. Since then, Fearon [30], Alesina et al. [31], and Montalvo and  
Reynal-Querol [5,6] have improved the empirical basis by including information from a variety of 
additional sources. To this growing list of diversity data sets, Cederman et al. [32] adds an expert 
survey on relevant ethnic groups that tracks power shifts in ethnic political constellations.  
The majority of authors working on ethnicity and related cleavages agree with Vanhanen [33] that 
only the most important ethnic divisions should be taken into account. In a very comprehensive article, 
Fearon [30] presents a list of 822 groups in 160 countries that had over half a million inhabitants in 
1990. Apart from language, Fearon ([30], p. 210) includes other ―criteria distinguishing groups, 
provided that the groups are locally understood as (primarily) descent groups and are locally viewed as 
socially or politically most consequential‖. Similarly Alesina and colleagues [31] compile information 
on 650 distinct ethnic groups in 190 countries and take into account ―not only language, but also other 
cleavages such as racial characteristics‖ ([31], p. 157). Both sources provide a fractionalization 
measure but also data on the individual groups on which they are based. Unfortunately, Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol offer us a ready-made data set of diversity measures for 138 countries and an unknown 
number of groups. Thus, after the initial replication of the results originally presented in the articles 
that we evaluate for illustrative purposes, the empirical analyses that we will present in the subsequent 
sections rely on the Fearon data set using the RQ polarization formula [34]. 
In their studies, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [5] have found encompassing evidence that 
polarization—either ethnic or religious—rather than fractionalization increases the risk of civil war 
and conclude that ―…the weak explanatory power of ethnic heterogeneity on the incidence of civil 
wars found by several recent studies is due to the use of an index of fractionalization instead of an 
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index of polarization‖ ([5], p. 812). Hence, coding decisions for such indicators are of utter importance 
and we therefore compare in the following our measures based on the Fearon data with the 
Reynal-Querol diversity data. In the construction of their indices, MRQ rely on standard sources like 
the World Christian Encyclopedia (WCE). The classification particularly focuses on the  
ethno-linguistic families detailed in WCE which considers the nearness of languages and of racial, 
ethnic, cultural and cultural-area characteristics. In general, our measures, based on Fearon and those 
used by MRQ, are quite similar, but we believe that the differences that we do see are due to coding 
decisions [35]. However, since the authors do not provide a listing of the individual groups that went 
into their ethnicity measures, we cannot assess the data regarding ethnic groups. To illustrate our 
concern, we therefore describe some decisions the authors make regarding the definition of religious 
groups that differ from ours. These definitions can be found in the articles under consideration. 
For instance, we think it is debatable to consider Animist religions and syncretic cults as a category 
of their own, but to merge Protestants and Catholics into a single group dubbed ―Christians‖. During 
the past few years, Protestantism has been rapidly expanding in Latin America, and Protestants are 
demanding more equal treatment. Especially in Brazil, tensions between the Latin American Catholic 
Church and Protestants are visible [36]. Furthermore, although tensions between Catholics and 
Protestants have generally weakened throughout the past decades in the developed world, political 
sociologists still consider this to be an important and newly intensified cleavage [37]. At least in Great 
Britain this religious antagonism has fuelled the violence that beset Northern Ireland from the 1960s to 
the end of the 1990s. 
The categorization of syncretic cults is more difficult. In general, historians of religion agree that all 
religions are more or less syncretistic, as Syncretism is defined as a process through which elements of 
one religion are assimilated into another one [38-40]. It is true, as viewed by Montalvo and  
Reynal-Querol [5], that in Latin America a considerable part of the population, mainly indigenous 
people, is affiliated with, for example, Catholicism while they are practicing what is betoken as 
Syncretism. But the term denotes by definition the mixing of religious elements and traditions and very 
often refers to the adaptation of the imported religion into a specific regional context. Hence, the term 
emphasizes similarities rather than differences [42]. Because of these cultural adaptations and 
modifications, Syncretism is contested as a legitimate category among scholars of religion [44]. The 
elusiveness of this concept pertains to the problem that people who mix elements of various religions 
may not do so deliberately and rarely call themselves ―Syncretists‖ [45,46]. In other words, it remains 
unclear why we should count such cults as a separate religion.  
A similar but distinct case is Animism. Animist groups in Africa and African religions in general 
have absorbed many elements from Christianity and Islam. But in contrast to Syncretism, the term 
―Animism‖ is widely used and receives a clear attribution as ―belief in spiritual beings who are 
concerned with human affairs and capable of intervening in them‖ [47]. In addition, African countries 
have a richer tradition in fusing the political and the religious. Claffey [48] observes, in this vein, that 
African leaders generally look for legitimization within the spiritual sphere and that basic relations 
with the primary church are not conflict-free. This, in our opinion, justifies the incorporation of 
traditional religions rather than Animism as a separate category.  
Our alternative measure of religious polarization takes the differences between ―Syncretism‖ and 
―Animism‖ into account and considers, in line with Fearon, only the most consequential divisions 
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within a society. Thus, the measure we use in the following breaks up ―Christians‖ into subgroups, 
does not code Syncretic cults, but treats traditional religions in the case of Africa as a separate category; 
this is in accordance with the coding decision underlying the Fearon data set. We can illustrate with 
some examples that seemingly trivial coding decisions are not innocuous. Based on our definition of 
religion division, we attribute a religion polarization value of 0.76 instead of 0.14 to the United 
Kingdom, as it can be found in the data set of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol. Peru, which was shaken 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s by the revolt of the Marxist Sendero Luminoso, receives a religion 
polarization value of 0.36 instead of 0.88.
 
 
Another way in which our research design differs from the original investigation is the definition of 
our dependent variable. The original calculation uses the ―incidence‖ rather than the ―onset‖ of civil 
war as the phenomenon of interest. Note that the use of the former concept stands in sharp contrast to 
the overwhelming majority of current studies on the causes of civil war, like the contributions made by 
Fearon and Laitin [14] and Collier and Hoeffler [12]. Current studies tend to concentrate on the 
―onset‖ of civil wars, and there is good reason to do so. Studying interstate wars, Beck [49] points out 
that the use of ―onset‖ rather than ―incidence‖ is not just a matter of taste. First, the factors that 
contribute to the launching of a social conflict might not necessarily be the same as the ones that keep 
feeding it. Second, the risk that a civil war continues is much higher than the case of a war outbreak. 
To resolve this problem, Beck ([49], p. 171) recommends that the model specification should contain 
variables that ―would allow the probability of a dispute to be vastly higher if it immediately follows a 
previous year with a dispute.‖ Other escape routes that he recommends are the use of transition models 
or event history models for that matter.  
In the context of intrastate wars, Elbadawi and Sambanis [50] make a similar point and distinguish 
between onset and duration of civil wars. Brandt et al. [51] argue that the study of the duration of civil 
wars is concerned with the subset of countries that already have fallen victim to a conflict outbreak. In 
other words, it is unreasonable to expect that the same features that increase the risk of conflict 
similarly keep the flames of conflict burning once a war has erupted. Table 1 illustrates that using the 
incidence variable changes the sample of cases considerably. As we will show below, the usage of this 
indicator, and not the more commonly used onset variable, is one of the reasons why Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol obtain results in favor of their polarization conjecture. Out of the 127 incidences of 
civil war studied by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 47 are onsets. 25 of these onsets continued over the 
next five-year-period. Hence, the risk that a conflict persists is much larger than the chance that a 
country experiences a conflict onset in the first place. As illustrations of wars with a duration of more 
than five years, consider, for instance, the conflicts we have seen in Southern Sudan or Angola. 
If we use the incidence variable, the same conflict repeatedly reappears in the sample. This multiple 
counting of the exact same cases is as grave as the diversity variables hardly changing over time. To 
show that the specifications of the dependent variable make a statistical difference, we use both 
‗incidence‘ and ‗onset‘ as outcome variables in our evaluation of the MRQ results. 
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Table 1. Civil war onset vs. incidence as the dependent variable. The total of 780 refers to 
the number of observations of the model estimated in Table 2 column (2). 
  Onset 
  Yes No 
Continued in 
5-year period 
Yes 25 733 
No 22 - 
 
With respect to time dependence, we will heed Beck‘s second advice and use an event-history 
approach after assessing the risk of civil war with the help of yearly data and by controlling for 
dynamics. Event history models are appropriate if one understands an individual war as a sickness to 
which a country might fall victim at a single point of time rather than repeatedly, like the models by 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol implicitly suggest. In conflict research, the usage of duration models is 
common practice. MRQ have relied on this methodology and show that ethnically polarized countries 
endure longer wars [52]. Such an undertaking requires, however, a different theory as the factors that 
cause a certain sickness are, as indicated, not necessarily the same as ones that are responsible for its 
duration. We opted for a country-year frame also because most covariates used in MRQ are available 
at this level of temporal aggregation and the fractionalization and polarization measures used in MRQ 
and our evaluation are almost time invariant. 
Regarding the relationship between polarization and development, MRQ refer the reader to a 
different publication [6] in which they establish an indirect negative influence of ethnic polarization on 
growth via the positive impact of this factor on civil war. Therefore, as a last test we reexamine this 
finding using the seminal study of Easterly and Levine [7] as the base line model on how 
fractionalization undermines economic growth; adding our indices to their setup for ethnic and 
religious fractionalization and polarization (for a similar application see Valsecchi [53]).  
As mentioned above, after the initial replication, we rely on the Fearon data set using the RQ 
formula to calculate ethnic and religious polarization. This means in particular that in Table 2—the 
table reporting the results for the five year periods—we rely on the covariates provided by MRQ (GDP 
per capita, population size, primary commodity export, percentage of mountainous terrain in a country, 
noncontiguous states, democracy, and data on ethnic and religious divisions) and only alter our 
definition of the dependent variable [54]. Table 3 and Table 4 present the models in which the 
country-year is the unit of analysis. We control the influence of the same covariates as in the 
previously presented calculations, but use the Fearon data for the operationalization of our diversity 
measures. Again, the tables provide the results across different definitions of the dependent  
variable [55].  
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Table 2. Civil War, Fractionalization and Polarization (Five year periods). 
 Published   Published   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PRIOcw PrioCW  
Onset 
Onset 25 PRIOcw PrioCW  
Onset 
Onset 25 
LGDPC −0.419* −0.186 −0.497*** −0.328 −0.292 −0.664*** 
 (0.235) (0.257) (0.162) (0.291) (0.233) (0.149) 
LPOP 0.399** 0.331** 0.259** 0.438*** 0.426*** 0.337*** 
 (0.181) (0.149) (0.124) (0.146) (0.140) (0.105) 
PRIMEXP −1.073 −0.441 1.614* −0.354 0.463 2.416** 
 (1.867) (1.553) (0.940) (1.713) (1.648) (0.942) 
MOUNTAINS −0.002 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.000 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) 
NONCONT 0.290 0.248 0.616* 0.308 0.382 0.656* 
 (0.597) (0.556) (0.351) (0.625) (0.599) (0.390) 
DEMOCRACY 0.034 −0.287 −0.076 0.017 −0.320 −0.045 
 (0.365) (0.469) (0.283) (0.362) (0.478) (0.284) 
ETHPOL 2.289** 0.514 0.852 - - - 
 (1.026) (1.108) (0.742)    
ETHFRAC 0.178 1.368 0.560 - - - 
 (0.916) (1.057) (0.720)    
RELPOL - - - 3.903** 2.975* 1.488 
    (1.983) (1.725) (1.313) 
RELFRAC - - - −4.972* −3.887 −2.855 
    (3.008) (2.709) (2.014) 
Constant −6.299** −7.574** −3.345 −6.897** −7.762** −2.574 
 (3.140) (3.442) (2.244) (3.047) (3.347) (2.141) 
Observations 846 780 760 846 780 760 
Nº of countries 117 115 115 117 115 115 
Pseudo R2 0.122 0.0868 0.0853 0.110 0.0813 0.0817 
NOTE: Logit models with either civil war incidence or onset as the dependent variable and country 
five-year periods as observations. Income and population are lagged one year; robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 2 display the published logit estimates from Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol for the cases of ethnic and religious divisions and their impact on the incidence of civil 
war, their original dependent variable (PRIOcw) [56]. For their diversity indicators, they find that 
ethnic polarization outperforms ethnic fractionalization, whereas the religious variables are only 
significant when introduced jointly in the equation. What the authors do not mention is that the 
correlation between these indices amounts to the problematic level of 0.95 [58]. The corresponding 
figure for the measures of ethnic diversity is 0.61 [59]. As it is hard to differentiate between 
fractionalization and polarization empirically, we argue elsewhere that it is more appropriate to use a 
dummy variable that captures only the cases of very high polarization [28]. In order to follow MRQ‘s 
research strategy as closely as possible, we will nevertheless adopt their specification. 
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Columns (2) and (5) use the Uppsala/PRIO conflict data [60]—the same source as MRQ—and the 
author‘s original definition of civil war (at least 25 battle-deaths a year plus an accumulated total of at 
least 1,000 deaths). However, we code the dependent variable as the onset rather than the incidence of 
armed conflict (PrioCW onset) [61]. Note that we are still using the original diversity measures 
provided by MRQ. The result table shows that in the regressions using the onset of civil war, Israel and 
Myanmar are dropped, as the conflicts in those countries began before the time period under 
consideration, i.e., before 1960. If we avoid the double counting of conflicts that span more than one  
5-year period, the impact of ethnic polarization on the risk of war shrinks and loses its statistical 
significance [62]. Religious polarization also stops to exert a significant effect on the risk of war once 
we move to the lower conflict threshold of 25 battle deaths per year (Onset 25), as shown in columns 
(3) and (6). In accordance with Collier and Hoeffler [12] (but see [63]), primary commodity exports 
fuel civil war onset as do poverty and population size.  
In a next step we turn to our models using country-years rather than 5-year periods. Again, our logit 
specifications in Table 3 follow MRQ‘s research design as closely as possible, controlling for the same 
covariates as the original study [64]. Additionally, we control for time dependence between 
observations, adopting the solution put forward by Beck et al. [65]. We add a counter for the years of 
peace a country experiences until an outbreak of war to the regression and also include three natural 
cubic splines. Admittedly, censoring the consecutive conflict years by focusing on onset rather than 
incidence reduces the serial correlation between cases. It does not, nevertheless, reduce the dependence 
over time between the observations of peace [66]. Because we rely on Fearon‘s [30] encompassing 
data set in this second set of tests, the analysis now covers 160 countries; 132 of these are included in 
the ethnic diversity group and 134 in the religious diversity group. 
Columns (1) and (4) follow MRQ‘s design and estimate a regression using civil war incidence as a 
dependent variable (PrioCW). Note that our dependent variable is based on a more recent version of 
the Uppsala/PRIO conflict data. It therefore slightly differs from the MRQ indicator. Furthermore, our 
diversity measures are now based on Fearon [30]. Despite these minor changes our estimations 
confirm, in the spirit of the original publication by MRQ, that ethnic polarization outperforms ethnic 
fractionalization as an explanatory variable. However, the religious polarization and fractionalization 
indices are far from reaching statistical significance and the democracy dummy only exerts a 
statistically significant negative influence on the incidence of civil war.  
In the regressions using onset instead of incidence (see columns (2) and (5)), Israel and Myanmar 
are once again dropped from the estimation. Changing the dependent variable results in the same 
findings as before, i.e. neither ethnic nor religious polarization has a significant effect on the risk of 
civil war onset. However, when we use our alternative definition of civil war onset, and thus 
concentrate on minor armed conflict (see columns (3) and (6)), ethnic polarization exhibits a 
significant and positive impact on the onset of internal wars although the size of the coefficient drops 
considerably. Lowering the threshold for civil wars increases the number of onsets substantially. For 
instance, Bolivia, Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Spain are all countries that experienced this sort of 
low-level armed conflict [67]. The results suggest that not only model specification matters, but also 
the definition of conflict; although this specification does not make a difference with regard to 
religious diversity (column (6)). 
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Table 3. Civil War, Fractionalization and Polarization (One year periods,  
Logit regressions). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PrioCW PrioCW 
Onset 
Onset 25 PrioCW PrioCW  
Onset 
Onset 25 
lGDP −0.040 −0.350 −0.400*** 0.067 −0.313 −0.462*** 
 (0.158) (0.226) (0.126) (0.159) (0.198) (0.123) 
lPopulation 0.379*** 0.379*** 0.290*** 0.325*** 0.348*** 0.260*** 
 (0.094) (0.103) (0.078) (0.104) (0.117) (0.092) 
Primexp −2.005* 0.122 0.299 −1.879 0.247 0.871 
 (1.205) (1.173) (0.867) (1.165) (1.183) (0.799) 
Mountains 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
Noncont 0.248 0.286 0.214 0.187 0.289 0.254 
 (0.383) (0.435) (0.269) (0.388) (0.438) (0.279) 
Democracy −0.457* −0.457 −0.185 −0.538** −0.495 −0.160 
 (0.261) (0.327) (0.235) (0.269) (0.337) (0.231) 
Ethnic Pol. 1.849*** 1.057 1.050** - - - 
(Fearon) (0.701) (0.754) (0.524)    
Ethnic Fract.  −0.195 −0.043 0.379 - - - 
(Fearon) (0.665) (0.850) (0.538)    
Religious Pol. - - - 1.178 1.028 −0.296 
(Fearon)    (0.946) (1.274) (0.757) 
Religious Fract. - - - −1.649 −1.272 −0.112 
(Fearon)    (1.269) (1.784) (1.016) 
Constant −2.337 −5.958** −4.238*** −1.678 −5.502*** −2.531* 
 (1.452) (2.363) (1.302) (1.461) (2.062) (1.321) 
Observations 4999 4414 4233 5048 4459 4271 
N° of countries 132 130 130 134 132 132 
Pseudo R2 0.695 0.0973 0.0882 0.691 0.0926 0.0792 
NOTE: Logit models with either civil war incidences or onset as the dependent variable and 
country years as observations. Income and population are used with their natural logarithm and 
lagged one year. We account for duration dependence using peace-years correction and three 
natural cubic splines calculated with the program BTSCS Data Analysis Utility Version 4.0.4. The 
results for these variables are not shown. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Finally, we estimate the risk of civil war with the help of event history models in Table 4. The 
starting period is 1960 or the year when a country became independent. Note that the data set includes 
delayed entries and, for some countries, multiple war onsets [68]. We use exponential proportional 
hazard models, a standard technique that assumes that the risk of a war onset, given the covariates, 
remains constant [69]. To further examine the question of incidence vs. onset, we use the incidence of 
minor armed conflicts as dependent variable in models (3) and (7) (Intwar 25). The results shown in 
Table 4 exhibit the same pattern as described for the logit models in Table 3. 
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Whenever incidence is used as the dependent variable, ethnic polarization exhibits a significant and 
positive impact on civil war, whereas ethnic fractionalization does not (columns (1) and (3)). Yet, an 
increase in the risk of civil unrest cannot be observed for the conflict indicator that accounts for onsets 
of smaller civil wars (columns (2) and (4)). Religious heterogeneity, in turn, does not count as an 
explanatory variable regardless of the definition of the dependent variable, apart from GDP and 
population, nor do any of the control variables reach conventional levels of significance. This 
demonstrates that the debate, over which form of diversity affects the risk of war, is not yet settled.  
Table 4. Civil War, Fractionalization and Polarization (One year periods,  
Exponential survival). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 PrioCW PrioCW  
Onset 
Intwar 25 Onset 25 PrioCW PrioCW 
Onset 
Intwar 25 Onset 25 
lGDP 0.641** 0.681** 0.622*** 0.690*** 0.695* 0.705** 0.629*** 0.640*** 
 (0.138) (0.128) (0.102) (0.077) (0.130) (0.109) (0.089) (0.063) 
lPopulation  1.344*** 1.401*** 1.337*** 1.236*** 1.280** 1.372*** 1.285*** 1.210** 
 (0.142) (0.146) (0.112) (0.091) (0.135) (0.154) (0.113) (0.095) 
Primexp 0.259 1.047 0.347 1.326 0.416 1.113 0.734 2.261 
 (0.460) (1.158) (0.442) (1.113) (0.679) (1.306) (0.837) (1.799) 
Noncont 1.355 1.200 1.434 0.985 1.255 1.195 1.425 1.036 
 (0.602) (0.442) (0.498) (0.260) (0.574) (0.452) (0.488) (0.276) 
Democracy 0.880 0.648 1.060 0.858 0.831 0.629 1.054 0.892 
 (0.233) (0.206) (0.218) (0.188) (0.222) (0.205) (0.218) (0.193) 
Mountains 1.002 0.999 1.002 1.000 1.005 0.999 1.005 1.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
Ethnic Fract. 0.619 0.955 0.919 1.408 - - - - 
(Fearon) (0.563) (0.788) (0.685) (0.700)     
Ethnic Pol. 10.229*** 2.018 6.653*** 2.189 4.743 2.576 2.682 0.609 
(Fearon) (8.028) (1.488) (4.462) (1.061) (6.561) (3.111) (2.807) (0.436) 
Rel. Pol.  - - - - 0.135 0.384 0.261 1.314 
(Fearon)     (0.254) (0.652) (0.361) (1.273) 
Observations 4984 4984 4984 4984 5033 5033 5033 5033 
N° of 
countries 
132 132 132 132 134 134 134 134 
N° of failure 651 71 902 142 655 71 916 145 
LR chi2 44.57 56.81 77.99 79.23 27.90 37.51 46.43 52.37 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NOTE: Coefficients in the table are estimated using exponential survival regression and report the 
estimated multiplicative effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the mean time 
until failure (Hazard ratios). Income and population are used with their natural logarithm. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Such a caveat is also in line with studies focusing on the impact that diversity has on the magnitude 
of war. Using a dichotomous measure of polarization, Lacina [70], for instance, shows that polarized 
societies experience less rather than more severe civil conflicts, measured by the number of battle 
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deaths. We believe that this correlation needs a sound theoretical basis, as it is in contrast to the 
theoretical finding of Esteban and Ray [25] and the empirical evidence assembled by Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol [52]. These contrasting findings show that the field should move away from attempts to 
establish one facet of diversity, like polarization as the core variable, which proves superior for the 
explanation of all sorts of political violence. While it may be sensibly linked to the duration of wars,  
it is, in our view, not a good explanation for the onset of conflict as two equally strong groups  
can sensibly deter each other from using force. It seems, moreover, more interesting to explore  
the interaction of diversity with the institutional setting for the explanation of various social  
outcomes. This is especially relevant as many young democracies still experiment with varying 
constitutional recommendations.  
5. Diversity and Economic Growth: Empirical Patterns 
Diversity is also often linked to the development of a country. Our final test looks at the relationship 
between diversity and economic growth. Our re-calculations presented here suggest additional 
ambiguities that the future study of diversity has to take into account. We estimate the average annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita per decade and control with dummy variables for the decades (1960, 
1970, and 1980) and a data set of 160 countries. In accordance with Easterly and Levine, we employ 
seemingly unrelated regression as a method to causally link development to civil war (for details 
see [7]) [71]. Since religious polarization and fractionalization are highly correlated, we do not use 
both variables together in the growth regressions.  
We are able to replicate the Easterly and Levine results almost one to one, although there are minor 
differences in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients. The most striking difference is that, in 
almost all models, the dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa does not exhibit a statistically significant effect. 
Furthermore, the variable for average educational attainment, the log of schooling, is significant in the 
models containing what Easterly and Levine call policy variables, i.e., in the models in columns (3), 
(4), (7) and (8). Financial depth always shows a positive influence on long-run growth, but, contrary to 
the original article, reaches statistical significance. In agreement with the original study, ethnic 
fractionalization always exerts a negative influence on growth. Interestingly, the effect of ethnic 
polarization runs into the opposite direction, but is not statistically significant in the baseline model 
(see also Valsecchi [53]). This means, in contrast to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [6], extreme ethnic 
divisions translate into increased rather than decreased economic growth, which renders the idea 
plausible that a high level of competition between highly visible and thus identifiable groups might be 
good for the economic prospects of a country [73]. 
In models, including the so-called policy variables, the magnitude of the ethnic polarization and 
fractionalization coefficients rises. Ethnic polarization is now highly significant, regardless of whether 
religious fractionalization or religious polarization is added. The latter variable exerts a significant and 
positive influence only in the model that takes into account the proxy variable for public policy; an 
indicator that counts telephones per worker confirming findings by Alesina et al. [31]. 
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Table 5. Fractionalization, polarization and economic development. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 gyp gyp gyp gyp gyp gyp gyp gyp 
Dummy 1960s −0.066 −0.090 −0.099 −0.084 −0.081 −0.107 −0.117 −0.113 
 (0.092) (0.093) (0.109) (0.111) (0.092) (0.093) (0.108) (0.109) 
Dummy 1970s −0.069 −0.092 −0.096 −0.078 −0.084 −0.109 −0.113 −0.107 
 (0.092) (0.093) (0.109) (0.110) (0.092) (0.093) (0.108) (0.109) 
Dummy 1980s −0.088 −0.112 −0.112 −0.094 −0.103 −0.128 −0.129 −0.122 
 (0.092) (0.093) (0.109) (0.110) (0.092) (0.093) (0.108) (0.109) 
Dummy SSA −0.006 −0.007 −0.005 −0.010 −0.009 −0.011* −0.008 −0.014** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Dummy Latin −0.019*** −0.019*** −0.014*** −0.017*** −0.019*** −0.018*** −0.013*** −0.016*** 
America/Carrib (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log of initial 0.030 0.037 0.045 0.050* 0.034 0.041* 0.049* 0.057** 
income (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) 
Log of initial  −0.002 −0.003* −0.004** −0.005*** −0.003* −0.003** −0.004** −0.006*** 
income 2 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log of  0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.009* 0.011** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.008* 
schooling (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Assassinations - −24.631** −25.208*** −29.581*** - −26.986** −26.879*** −31.554*** 
  (10.512) (9.486) (8.904)  (10.568) (9.450) (8.831) 
Financial depth - - 0.023*** 0.019** - - 0.023*** 0.019** 
   (0.008) (0.008)   (0.008) (0.007) 
Black market - - −0.021*** −0.020*** - - −0.022*** −0.020*** 
premium   (0.004) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.004) 
Fiscal surplus/ - - 0.077** 0.166*** - - 0.082*** 0.172*** 
GDP   (0.031) (0.036)   (0.031) (0.036) 
Log telephones - - - 0.010*** - - - 0.010*** 
per worker    (0.003)    (0.003) 
Ethnic Fract. −0.025** −0.028*** −0.045*** −0.045*** −0.027*** −0.030*** −0.044*** −0.043*** 
(Fearon) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Ethnic Pol. 0.008 0.012 0.028*** 0.036*** 0.008 0.011 0.026*** 0.034*** 
(Fearon) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Rel. Fract. −0.009 −0.005 0.004 0.001 - - - - 
(Fearon) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)     
Rel. Pol. - - - - 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.011* 
(Fearon)     (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Observations 253 250 183 169 253 250 183 169 
Nº of id 92 92 76 71 92 92 76 71 
Wald chi2 242.1 251.9 278.8 383.3 238.6 252.0 287.8 399.7 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NOTE: Growth Regressions: Pooled Decades (1960s, 1970s, 1980s). Estimated using xtgee in Stata 
for Seemingly Unrelated Regression with unbalanced equations: a separate regression for each 
period. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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6. Conclusion 
Speculations on the impact of diversity on social outcomes abound due to the growing 
heterogeneity of many societies around the world. Some publications have fuelled the concern that 
increasing diversity bodes badly for these countries. A most notable case is Huntington‘s [2] essay on 
the ―Clash of Civilizations‖. Analytically, there are different possibilities in which we can think about 
the impact that diversity has on social outcomes. We believe that empirical research has not been 
sufficiently careful in developing causal mechanisms that link one particular facet of diversity to one 
particular social outcome. In other words, while fragmentation might lower the risk of one form of 
violence, it can increase the propensity of another form of violence; and while polarization might 
affect economic development given a certain institutional configuration, it might not do so in all 
contexts. We therefore believe that the field should move away from a simplifying understanding of 
diversity that links one of its many manifestations, be it polarization or fractionalization, to all sorts of 
social dysfunctions like armed conflict and underdevelopment [74]. 
We have used recent controversies and the role played by fractionalization or polarization to 
illustrate that the empirical study of diversity needs better theories and, in some instances, better 
indicators and data. Future studies should for instance use refined measures of polarization that truly 
differentiate this concept from fractionalization at the empirical level. Although we have ample reason 
to believe that polarization increases the risk of various forms of violence [17], we also need to look 
more carefully into the role that political institutions play in this context [24,28]. Political sociologists 
have for a long time recognized that institutions are partly a response to social divisions. Yet, the rules 
that guide the interactions between competing groups are not completely determined by the social 
fabric surrounding them. On the contrary, institutions exert a significant impact on social relations on 
their own. In democratic regimes, for instance, the structure of party systems is of utmost  
importance [6]. Therefore, we consider a careful consideration of context specific explanations to be a 
promising avenue for future research. The theoretical and empirical exploration of the joint impact that 
institutions, economic factors and diversity have on social processes seems particularly farsighted to us. 
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55. The appendix to this article summarizes the operational definitions and the sources of the data.  
56. We cross-checked our logit models in two ways. First, we used the relogit command in Stata to 
control for the rare event character of very violent wars (see [57]). Second, we relied on 
generalized estimation equations (GEE) with a binomial distribution and a one-year time lag for 
the autocorrelation structure. To reassess the results from our exponential survival regression, we 
also estimated semiparametric Cox proportional hazard models with GDP and Population as 
time-varying covariates. The results did not differ substantively from those reported here and are 
available upon request. Additionally, for all our models and robustness checks we used 
fractionalization and polarization measures based on the data of Alesina et al [30]. With this 
alternative resource, polarization never exhibits a significant positive impact on civil war, 
whatever specification of the dependent variable we use. 
57. King, G.; Zeng, L. Logistic regression in rare events. Polit. Anal. 2001, 9, 137-163. 
58. In the case of the religious measures the authors do consider this problem in Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol [6] and use these indices separately, whereas in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [5] 
they do not. Alesina et al. [31] already hint at this problem in their article and demonstrate that the 
polarization index works best when highly correlated with the fractionalization measure. 
59. Our ethnic fractionalization and the ethnic polarization index based on Fearon exhibit a 
correlation of 0.65, our religious fractionalization and religious polarization measures one of 0.88. 
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60. Gleditsch, N.P.; Wallensteen, P.; Eriksson, M.; Sollenberg, M.; Strand, H. Armed conflict  
1946–2001: A new dataset. J. Peace Res. 2002, 39, 615-637. 
61. There are minor deviations, as we use a more recent version of this data set (Version 3.0) than 
MRQ (Version unknown). The correlation between our incidence variable and the one used by 
MRQ amounts to 0.96. 
62. Fearon [63] hints at the problem that dropping periods of ongoing war is artificially increasing the 
mean of the dependent variable and proposes as a ―natural alternative‖ to code them as zeros. 
Applying this approach to all our replication models (including those in Table 1) does not affect 
our results substantially. 
63. Fearon, J.D. Primary commodity exports and civil war. J. Conflict Resolut. 2005, 49, 483-507. 
64. To simplify the presentation of the covariates in the Table, but still distinguish the 5-year periods 
from the country-year data, we use the same abbreviations, but not in capitals as in the original 
publication. See appendix for sources of the yearly data. 
65. Beck, N.; Katz, J.N.; Tucker, R. Taking time seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section analysis with a 
binary dependent variable. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 1998, 42, 1260-1288. 
66. Beck, Katz and Tucker have constructed an algorithm that can be used in this context. Available 
online: http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Stata-Tools/ (accessed on 31 March 2010). The 
splines are tied together at certain knots, which we place at the years 1, 4, and 7 following the 
suggestion from Beck, Katz, and Tucker [65]. A significance test of the cubic splines indicates the 
need to correct for duration dependence. 
67. Likewise, this pattern persisted with our dummy variable of ethnic polarization. In the case of 
minor armed conflict, the variable always had a positive, statistically significant influence on the 
onset of civil war. 
68. The event history models using onset include the cases of Israel and Myanmar, treating them as 
censored cases. 
69. As mentioned above, we also used the less restrictive semi-parametric Cox proportional 
hazard model. 
70. Lacina, B. Explaining the severity of civil wars. J. Conflict Resolut. 2006, 50, 276-289.  
71. Since in Stata the command for seemingly unrelated regression is not suitable for estimation with 
unbalanced panels, thus resulting in loss of information, we use the xtgee command with a 
Gaussian family, an identity link, and an unstructured within-group correlation structure [72] 
72. McDowell, A. From the help desk: Seemingly unrelated regression with unbalanced equations. 
Stata J. 2004, 4, 442-448. 
73. The ethnic diversity measures based on Alesina show the same relationship for the growth 
regressions as our indices based on Fearon. However, note that the interpretation of the effects as 
laid out in Easterly and Levine [7] is not warranted anymore since we include the diversity 
measures together in the regressions for illustrative purposes. 
74. The concern for causal explanations in the social sciences has attracted increasing interest. See 
Falleti and Lynch [75] especially for a discussion of context embeddedness. 
75. Falleti, T.G.; Lynch, J. Context and causal mechanisms in political analysis. Comp. Polit. Stud. 
2009, 42, 1143-1166. 
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Appendix 
With the exception of the variable for the onset of civil war, all variables from Table 1 are taken 
from MRQ`s original dataset (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [40] for details). Tables 2 and 3 put the 
MRQ study within a country-year frame using the same covariates (for details, see below). Table 5 
uses original data from Easterly and Levine [18] (see [18] for detailed explanations) with additional 
information on ethnic and religious divisions using the Fearon data.  
PrioCW: Our analyses focus on internal and internationalized internal conflicts and are thus limited 
to disputes that are located in the country of reference (type 3 and 4). We generated a dichotomous 
variable, i.e., the conflict indicator is 1 if the incompatibility results in at least 25 battle-related deaths 
per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths. This is equivalent to the intermediate armed 
conflict and war definition of the Uppsala/PRIO armed conflict data set (Gleditsch et al. [24]).  
PrioCW Onset: Same as PrioCW dropping all subsequent years of an ongoing conflict to capture 
the onset of civil war. 
Intwar 25: Definition of minor armed conflict of the Uppsala/PRIO armed conflict data set. Again 
we concentrate on type 3 and 4 incompatibilities. The dummy variable is 1 if the threshold of 25 
battle-related deaths has been crossed for the first time and 0 if no internal civil war has started in the 
year under consideration. 
Onset 25: Same as Intwar 25 dropping all subsequent years of an ongoing conflict. 
GDP: logged and lagged one year. Source: Fearon and Laitin [23]. To avoid systematic missings, 
we extrapolated the year 2000 where appropriate. As there have not been any major economic 
distortions in 2000, this should not cause any problems. Note also that the correlation of this variable 
with the one used by MRQ is 0.999 for their country sample. 
Population: Country-year population, logged and lagged one year. Source: Fearon and Laitin [23]. 
To avoid systematic missings, we extrapolated the years 1999 and 2000 under the condition that at 
least eight consecutive country years of observations before 1999 were available. Again, the 
correlation between this variable and the one used by MRQ is 0.997 for their country sample. 
Primexp: Primary commodity exports as proportion of GDP. Country-year version of the Collier 
and Hoeffler data [10] taken from Fearon [23], denoted there sxp.  
Mountains: Estimated percentage of mountainous terrain based on the on work by the geographer 
A. J. Gerard for the World Bank‘s ―Economics of Civil War, Crime, and Violence‖ project. Fearon and 
Laitin add twenty-two countries to this list. Source: Fearon and Laitin [23]. 
Noncont: Noncontiguous states are countries with territory holding at least 10,000 people and 
separated from the land area containing the capital city either by land or by 100 kilometers of water. 
Source: Fearon and Laitin [23]. 
Democracy: General openness of the political institutions (0 = low, 10 = high) from the Polity IV 
dataset. Like MRQ, we construct a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the score is higher or equal 
to 4.  
Ethnic Fractionalization: We use a measure from Fearon [21] who relied on the 
Encyclopedia Britannica, the CIA‘s World Factbook and other sources. The fractionalization index 
ranges from 0 to 1. 
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Ethnic Polarization: Our ethnic polarization measure, which is based on a list of ethnic groups per 
country from Fearon [21], was calculated using the RQ formula. 
Religious Fractionalization: We use a measure from Fearon [21]. The fractionalization index 
ranges from 0 to 1. 
Religious Polarization: Our measure is based on data about religious groups per country kindly 
provided by James. D. Fearon. R. Quinn Mecham used the CIA Factbook and several other sources to 
construct a list of adherents per country. Our measure was calculated using the RQ formula. 
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